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that in most cases, a system of private monies does not deliver price stability. And even when it does, it
always is subject to self-fulfilling inflationary episodes, and it supplies a suboptimal amount of money.
Although there is no economic reason to curb the use of cryptocurrencies at the moment, it is important
to review key regulatory issues that policymakers need to consider now, before the use of
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The sudden appearance of Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, and other cryptocurrencies1
has triggered a wave of interest in privately issued monies.
Today, any person with internet access can use a bewildering array of cryptocurrencies as means of exchange.
Nearly everyone has heard about Bitcoin, whose
market capitalization (as of May 28, 2018) exceeds
$123 billion—an amount greater than the market
capitalization of eight of the 30 companies in the Dow
Jones Industrial Average.2 But 21 other cryptocurrencies already have market capitalizations over $1 billion,
while another 109 have between $100 and $999.99
million. Just seven months earlier, only 12 cryptocurrencies had market capitalizations over $1 billion
and another 49 between $100 and $999.99 million.3
These are astonishing increases. While it is true that
cryptocurrencies represent only a trivial fraction of all
payments in the world economy, it is not inconceivable
that their use may continue to exponentially increase
over the next few years and even become widespread
in emerging economies with dysfunctional government
monies.
Nowadays it is straightforward to create a cryptocurrency. Thanks to fascinating advances in cryptography and computer science, cryptocurrencies solve the
traditional monetary problems of over-issuing, doublespending (i.e., the holder of the currency should not be
able to spend the same token twice), and counterfeiting.4 And cryptocurrencies are markedly different from

SUMMARY
• Many monetary reformers have welcomed the rise of cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, in part because they believe that
having currency competition will help achieve the economic
objective of price stability.
• This Issue Brief summarizes research that explores whether
competition among privately issued fiat currencies can actually
produce price stability. The research finds that in most cases,
a system of private monies does not deliver price stability. And
even when it does, it always is subject to self-fulfilling inflationary episodes, and it supplies a suboptimal amount of money.
• Even in the best-case scenario, a purely private monetary
system fails to provide the socially optimum quantity of money.
• Nevertheless, the threat of competition from private monies has at least one salutary effect: it imposes some market
discipline on any government involved in issuing currency. A
central bank needs to provide sufficiently “good” money, or
individuals can and will switch to using Bitcoin, Ethereum, or
some other cryptocurrency.
• Although there is no economic reason to curb the use of cryptocurrencies at the moment, the Issue Brief concludes by posing
some of the key regulatory issues that policymakers need to
consider now, before the use of cryptocurrencies becomes
even more widespread.
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TABLE 1

Rank

step further: is the scenario of a purely
private monetary system feasible?
That is the question I explore in my
research, and it leads to an interesting
follow-up question for government
policymakers. Specifically, can private
monies and a government-issued
money coexist? Other, more normative questions can certainly be asked as
well. For instance, how should governments react to private monies? Should
governments prevent the circulation of
private monies? Should governments
treat private monies as currencies or as
any other regular property? Should the
private monies be taxed?
In my research, I build a model of
competition among privately issued
fiduciary currencies.8 Returning to the
first question about private currency
competition, I find that, in most cases,
a system of private monies will not
deliver price stability and, even when
it does, it will always be subject to selffulfilling inflationary episodes, and it
will supply a suboptimal amount of
money. Currency competition works
only sometimes and partially, and it
may even be a socially wasteful activity.
In this Issue Brief, I will explore these
findings a bit more and discuss how
the advent of cryptocurrencies and
their associated technology may affect
the U.S. monetary system.

CRYPTOCURRENCIES BY MARKET CAPITALIZATION (>$3 BILLION AS
OF MAY 28, 2018)
Cryptocurrency

Market Cap

Established

1

Bitcoin

$123,000,000,000

2009

2

Ethereum

$53,200,000,000

2013

3

Ripple

$22,900,000,000

2012

4

Bitcoin Cash

$16,000,000,000

2017

5

EOS

$10,700,000,000

2017

6

Litecoin

$6,500,000,000

2011

7

Stellar

$4,900,000,000

2014

8

Cardano

$4,700,000,000

2017
2017

9

TRON

$4,300,000,000

10

IOTA

$3,900,000,000

2015

11

NEO

$3,200,000,000

2014

Source: https://coinmarketcap.com

the notes issued by financial institutions during the times of free banking
for three reasons.5 First, most cryptocurrencies are fully fiduciary, whereas
notes in the free banking era usually
represented claims against deposits in
gold or other assets. Second, cryptocurrencies are not directly related
to credit but are issued by computer
networks according to some pre-determined criteria, such as a “proof-ofwork” (i.e., solving a complex mathematical problem or validating other
cryptocurrency transactions). Third,
cryptocurrencies like Ethereum can
also work as a sophisticated automatic
escrow account. It is effortless to add

certain conditions for payment to the
code that controls the cryptocurrency.6
Over the past several years,
monetary reformers such as Sen.
Rand Paul have welcomed the rise
of cryptocurrencies and pointed to
currency competition as a possible key
to achieving the economic objective
of price stability. In this scenario, as
different issuers compete to make their
currency dominant, they are incentivized to perfect the administration of
their currency and reduce inefficiencies so as to maintain their currency’s
stable value.7 But can competition
among privately issued fiat currencies
work? And to take the experiment a

NOTES
Cryptocurrencies are digital currencies that exist independently of a central bank by using encryption techniques to
issue new units, record transactions, and combat fraud.
They are, in that sense, different from electronic monies
issued by governments.
2 Market capitalization is the price per unit times the circulating supply. Updated cryptocurrency market capitalization
figures are available at https://coinmarketcap.com.
3 Ibid.
4 For details, see Narayanan, A., J. Bonneau, E. Felten, A.
Miller, and S. Goldfeder (2016). Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency
1

Technologies. Princeton University Press.
For details, see Dowd, K. (1992). The Experience of Free
Banking. Routledge.
6 For example: “Peter will pay Mary 10 Ethereum if, tomorrow at noon, the weather in Philadelphia according to
weatherunderground.com is over 80 degrees.” Once that
code is in place, the verification of the specified conditions
and the payment—if the conditions are satisfied—can be
automatically implemented.
7 Wendy Milling, “Private Currency Competition Is the Monetary Answer,” Forbes, August 23, 2012.
5

2

The primary source for this Issue Brief is FernándezVillaverde, J. and D. Sanches (2016). “Can Currency
Competition Work?” CEPR Discussion Paper 11095. The
model developed here extends the environment introduced
in Lagos, R., and R. Wright (2005). “A unified framework for
monetary theory and policy analysis,” Journal of Political
Economy, 113(3), 463–484.
9 See Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff (1983). “Speculative
hyperinflations in maximizing models: Can we rule them
out?” Journal of Political Economy, 91(4), 675–87; and
Lagos, R., and R. Wright (2003). “Dynamics, cycles, and
8
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CAN CURRENCY
COMPETITION WORK?
In my analysis, a monetary equilibrium with private monies will not
generally deliver price stability. When
a profit-maximizing entrepreneur
issues money, she will try to maximize
the real value of seigniorage (i.e., the
difference between the value of money
and the cost to produce and distribute it). The conjecture that a system
of private monies competing among
themselves would provide a stable
means of exchange is, in general,
wrong. When an automaton issues
money, there is no particular reason
why the quantity of money issued
will be compatible with price stability, except by coincidence. Bitcoin,
for instance, has already decided how
many new units of currency will be
issued in 2022 even though nobody
knows what the demand for the currency will be in that year.
Furthermore, even when the
cost function of minting money is
such that there is equilibrium with
price stability, there is a continuum
of equilibrium trajectories where the
value of private monies monotonically
decreases and converges to zero. Such
self-fulfilling inflationary episodes,
observable in economies with gov-

ernment-issued money and a moneygrowth rule, are not, as it turns out, an
exclusive feature of public monies.9
Self-fulfilling inflationary episodes
are, instead, the consequence of using
intrinsically useless tokens—even if
those tokens are electronic and issued
by private, profit-maximizing, sharpwitted entrepreneurs—whose valuation
can change depending on expectations
about the future.
The goal of a well-behaved monetary system, however, must be to
achieve some efficiency goal, not price
stability per se. Perhaps the most
important result from my research is
that a purely private monetary system
does not provide the socially optimum
quantity of money even in the bestcase scenario (i.e., in equilibrium with
stable prices). Currency competition
cannot provide an optimal outcome
because, unlike the U.S. government,
entrepreneurs do not mint additional
tokens to account for the price effects
they create for other participants in
the market. Entrepreneurs just seek to
maximize profits.10 The market will
eventually fail to provide the right
amount of money, whereas it does not
fail to provide the right amount of
other goods. This is expected from a
theoretical standpoint, and my results
confirm this intuition.

It may help to take a closer look
at why this happens. Markets work
well without frictions, but money only
exists because of frictions. Specifically, money’s sole purpose is to solve
the problem of transaction frictions.
Money is not worth anything in itself,
unlike wheat, bananas, and Netflix,
which are valued for what they are.
Markets do well supplying the optimal amount of wheat and bananas
and Netflix because consumers can
substitute other goods in each of these
instances, if desired. The very reason
that money exists, however, is to provide liquidity service—something for
which there is no (practical) substitute.
This service is not properly rewarded in
the market, and the issuers of money
do not receive the commensurate benefits for offering liquidity. This is true
whether the money is privately-issued
or government-issued. But unlike
government-issued money, which has
fiscal backing, entrepreneurs issuing
private money will never internalize
the cost of providing more liquidity when it is not in their interest. To
paraphrase Milton Friedman: markets
can solve most problems, just not the
problem of money. And in part for
that reason, cryptocurrency competition cannot be the monetary cure-all
that some proponents have envisioned.

NOTES
sunspot equilibria in ’genuinely dynamic, fundamentally
disaggregative’ models of money,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 109(2), 156–171.
10 The price effects generated by a producer or a consumer
on third parties when they decide to produce or consume
more of something are known by economists as pecuniary
externalities. As we will explain below, in markets without
frictions, pecuniary externalities are of the “right size,”
as they induce the correct behavior by producers and
consumers. Thus, entrepreneurs seeking only to maximize
profits produce the “correct” amount of their good. In mar-

kets with frictions, pecuniary externalities have the “wrong
size” and entrepreneurs do not deliver the socially optimal
amount of the good they produce.
11 The money-growth rule proposes that a central bank
increase the money supply every year at a constant rate,
regardless of macroeconomic conditions.
12 Vincenzo Villamena, “Everything you need to know about
Bitcoin and your taxes,” CNBC, February 21, 2018.
13 See U.S. vs. Coinbase, Inc. (“Based upon an IRS search,
only 800 to 900 persons electronically filed a Form 8949
that included a property description that is “likely related to

3

14

bitcoin” in each of the years 2013 through 2015.”)
Anthony Peyton, “Australia’s new payments platform
launches,” BankingTech.com, February 13, 2018.
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TAKEAWAYS FOR
POLICYMAKERS
As an alternative means of exchange,
it is reasonable to expect that cryptocurrencies might have an effect on
government monetary policy. Consider the case where the government
follows a rather standard moneygrowth rule.11 Under this policy,
profit-maximizing entrepreneurs will
frustrate the government’s attempt to
implement a positive real return on
money through deflation when the
public is willing to hold private currencies. There are, fortunately, alternative policies that can simultaneously
promote stability and efficiency. For
example, the government may peg
the real value of its money. Under this
rule, the government can implement
an efficient allocation (i.e., supply the
amount of money that maximizes
social welfare) as the unique equilibrium outcome, but this would require
driving all private money out of the
economy. That is an unlikely scenario
for the U.S.
There is, however, an important
lesson here: the threat of competition
from private monies imposes some
market discipline on any government involved in issuing currency. If
a central bank, for example, does not
provide sufficiently “good” money,
then it will have difficulties in the
implementation of its desired allocations. This may be the best feature of
cryptocurrencies. In a world where
individuals can switch to Bitcoin
or Ethereum, central banks need to
provide, paraphrasing Adam Smith, a
tolerable administration of money. On

this front, at least, currency competition may have a large upside for
human welfare.
In the United States, there is
nothing that government policymakers should do to curb the use of
cryptocurrencies at the moment. They
do not challenge the dollar and should
be allowed to operate freely, although
U.S. regulators may want to consider
(more thoroughly) their responses
to issues raised by the existence of
cryptocurrencies. For instance, the IRS
currently treats decentralized currencies like Bitcoin as property and not
as regular currency.12 It may be more
accurate to tax cryptocurrencies like
other currencies. Taxable gains from
the growth in cryptocurrencies have
been drastically underreported over
the past few years, so some measure
may likely need to be taken to facilitate compliance.13 Additionally, any
steps that can be taken to ensure that
these private monies are not used for
criminal activity should be evaluated.
Otherwise, cryptocurrencies themselves pose no threat to U.S. monetary
policy operations.
Cryptocurrency technology,
however, does bring to the fore a
problem that will require serious
efforts from federal policymakers to
address adequately, and that is the
problem of the United States’ inefficient, costly (to users), and outdated
payment system. Today, it typically
takes 3-4 days to transfer money from
one U.S. bank account to another,
even though the sending account is
often debited immediately. Given
the current level of technology in the
world, this process should require

4

mere minutes. Nowhere is this reality
better exemplified than in Australia,
which earlier this year rolled out its
New Payments Platform (NPP). The
NPP enables customers with accounts
at different banking institutions “to
make payments to each other any time
of day, any day of the year.” Moreover,
the NPP uses an updated messaging
standard to improve data processing
and it “provides real-time settlement
via the Reserve Bank of Australia’s
Fast Settlement Service.”14 This
modern payments system is the result
of six years of work, following the
release of a strategic report on Australia’s previous system. There are fewer
bureaucratic and financial barriers in
Australia, but the creation of the NPP
gives an idea of how much lead-time
is required to modernize a country’s
payments system.
The technology associated with
cryptocurrencies is a proof of concept
for payment processing. Bitcoin can
typically be transferred in about an
hour. This sends the clear message that
the U.S. payment system is outdated
and could be much better. Revamping
the entire payment system is a complex project that would require cooperation from many actors, including
the Treasury Department, the Federal
Reserve, and most private deposittaking institutions. This transition will
eventually be unavoidable, particularly
as other countries continue to improve
their own systems—and especially if
the markets for cryptocurrencies continue their rapid growth—so serious
efforts should begin now.
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